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Abstract
This paper focuses on the dynamic capital structure of ¯rms: Why do ¯rms use very
di®erent ¯nancial contracts in di®erent stages of their life-cycles? In a model of optimal
¯nancial contracting, we investigate whether ¯rms' subsequent ¯nancing decisions are
a®ected by the outcome of their previous ¯nancing decisions. We ¯nd that the initial
and subsequent ¯nancing decisions of the same ¯rm may lead to di®erent security
choices. The ¯rms' ¯nancing decisions will di®er in two respect. First, there will be
equilibrium contracts that investors would reject for some startup ¯rm, but would
accept for an otherwise identical ongoing ¯rm (i.e. even when the two ¯rms have
identical projects). Secondly, even the set of the equilibrium ¯nancial contracts di®ers
in di®erent stages of the ¯rm's lifecycle: some contracts which are never sustainable
as an initial contract but become sustainable as a subsequent contract. The reason
is the stage-dependency of the control rights of subsequent claimholders: in addition
to their own rights, holders of subsequent security issues may also rely on the ¯rm's
existing investors to enforce their claims. Whether or not they can do so, depends on
the priority structure of the claims.
Consistent with empirical evidence, our theory implies a life-cycle pattern of ¯-
nancing: ¯rms will issue outside equity, short-term debt or convertible debt ¯rst, then
use their retained earnings, issue longer-term debt, or outside equity to satisfy sub-
sequent ¯nancing needs. Despite the presence of severe market imperfections, the
Modigliani-Miller indi®erence result between debt and equity does hold for ongoing
¯rms in our model, but at the same time, it fails to hold for entrepreneurial startups.
Since the control rights of previous securityholders represent an externality for sub-
sequent claimholders, the marginal decision of which security to issue next becomes
irrelevant once a ¯rm has su±cient contractual complexity in place.
Keywords: security design, nonveri¯ability of cash °ows, managerial moral hazard,
control rights, maturity, managerial dismissal, asset liquidation, capital structure.
JEL Classi¯cation: G34, L14
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1 Introduction
In practice the ¯nancial structures of small entrepreneurial ¯rms are typically very di®erent
from those of large, ongoing ¯rms. Small entrepreneurial ¯rms use convertible debt, private
equity and short-term bank loans, whereas larger, ongoing companies typically issue outside
equity and public debt. Interestingly, not only the types of the contracts di®er for companies
in di®erent stages of their life-cycles but there are also signi¯cant di®erences in the terms
(control rights and maturities) of the contracts even within the same class (debt or equity)
(See for example Kaplan and StrÄomberg (1999)).
While the practice is well-documented, there is very little theory to explain the di®erences
in the ¯nancing choices of ¯rms and in the design of ¯nancial contracts in di®erent stages of
the ¯rms' life cycles. Why are small entrepreneurial ¯rms, startups so di®erent from more
established, ongoing ¯rms? Why do ¯rms have very di®erent ¯nancial structures in di®erent
stages of their life-cycles?
The reason why no such investigation has been carried out earlier is that until re-
cently most of the ¯nancial contracting literature focused almost exclusively on small en-
trepreneurial ¯rms and ignored the ¯nancing decisions of more established, ongoing ¯rms.
Models that were developed for investigating the ¯nancing choices of entrepreneurs were
then used to make predictions about the capital structure decisions of larger, established
companies.1 With this perspective corporate ¯nance theory was unable to shed light on how
1Zwiebel (1996), Bolton and von Thadden (1998) and Fluck (1999a) are exceptions. In Zwiebel's model
when the manager chooses the ¯rm's capital structure he takes into account the impact the ¯rm's capital
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¯rms in various stages of their life-cycle di®er in the ¯nancing choices they make.2
We model the capital structure decisions of the startup and the ongoing ¯rm as di®erent
stages of the sequential decision-making process. The ¯rst stage is the ¯nancing of the
¯rm's initial project (we call it "startup"), the second stage is the ¯nancing of the ¯rm's
expansion project (we call it "ongoing ¯rm"). We model the startup as an entrepreneur
structure will have on his incentives and on his ability to stay with the ¯rm in the future. Zwiebel shows
that issuing debt commits the manager to make the right investment in the future and thereby enables him
to avoid the threat of takeover. Bolton and von Thadden develop a model of a large ¯rm to compare the
liquidity bene¯ts obtained through dispersed corporate ownership with the bene¯ts of e±cient management
control achieved by some degree of ownership concentration. In Fluck's model of entrenched management
and dispersed outside equity management chooses the distribution of equity ownership so as to maximize
private bene¯ts against the risk of potential control challenges. Our paper is related to Zwiebel (1996),
Bolton and von Thadden (1998) and Fluck (1999a), since these papers also develop models of a large ¯rm
that are distinct from the traditional founder-entrepreneur model of a small ¯rm. However, neither of these
articles studies the ¯nancing decisions of ¯rms in di®erent stages of their life-cycles, that is the focus of our
model.
2Diamond (1991) presents a model in which ¯rms access di®erent sources of ¯nancing as they develop
reputation. Banks provide screening and monitoring of companies. Firms use bank ¯nancing in the early
stages of their life-cycle or after a period of distress. As they develop a good reputation, companies can access
cheaper form of ¯nancing such as public debt. Our paper is closest in spirit to Diamond (1991). Unlike in
Diamond's model, the friction between the ¯rm and ¯nancier in our model is not asymmetric information
but the incompleteness of ¯nancial contracts. A further di®erence between the two papers is their focus:
Whereas Diamond's concentrates on the choice of between two alternatives, bank debt and public debt, our
focus is on the sequential ¯nancing decisions between various classes of debt and outside equity and on the
interaction between equity and debt holders.
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seeking ¯nancing for his initial project. Following Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and
Moore (1989), we assume that the entrepreneur can divert or manipulate the ¯rm's cash
°ows and it is prohibitively costly to prove any managerial wrongdoing for a third party
such as a court. Hence contracts can not be written on cash °ows because courts cannot
verify their realizations. Our model of the ongoing ¯rm is an enterprise which successfully
operates and ¯nances its initial project and seeks ¯nancing for an expansion project.
In this setting, we ¯nd that the initial and the subsequent ¯nancing decisions of the
same ¯rm may lead to di®erent security choices. The ¯rms' ¯nancing decisions will di®er
in two respect. First, there will be equilibrium contracts that investors would reject for
some startup ¯rm, but would accept them for an otherwise identical large ¯rm (i.e. when
the two ¯rms have identical projects). The reason is the stage-dependency of the control
rights of subsequent claim holders: in addition to their own rights, holders of subsequent
security issues may also rely on the ¯rm's existing investors to enforce their claims. As
a consequence, investors require lower pro¯tability threshold for ¯nancing a project in an
ongoing ¯rm than in an entrepreneurial startup. This enables the ongoing ¯rm to issue
securities that a startup ¯rm with an identical project cannot. Whether or not holders of
subsequent security issues can rely on the ¯rm's existing investors to enforce their claims
depends on the priority structure of the claims.3
Secondly, even the set of equilibrium ¯nancial contracts di®ers in di®erent stages of
3The importance of a well-de¯ned priority structure is also emphasized in Park(1999) in the context of
monitoring incentives. In Park's model the optimal debt contract delegates monitoring to a single lender
and seniority allows this lender to appropriate the full return from his monitoring activities.
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the ¯rm's life cycle. In particular, some contracts that are never sustainable at the initial
¯nancing stage may become sustainable at a subsequent ¯nancing stage. If investors are
willing to write a ¯nancial contract for a startup, they are always willing to write the same
contract for an otherwise identical ongoing ¯rm but not vice versa: there are contracts that
are only available for ongoing ¯rms. Again, the intuition lies in the interaction between the
control rights of existing and subsequent claim holders. Since holders of subsequent security
issues may also rely on the ¯rm's existing investors to enforce their claims, they are willing
to enter into contracts that they would have otherwise rejected as an initial contract.
Since the seminal paper of Modigliani and Miller [M&M] (1958), a vast literature4 has
developed to investigate the robustness of their result about investors' indi®erence between
debt and equity. These articles introduced taxes, asymmetric information, agency problems
and incomplete contracting into the M&M framework. With the exception of Dybvig and
Zender (1986),5 the literature concluded that the Modigliani-Miller proposition fails to hold
in the presence of market imperfections. A novel result of our analysis is that for a wide
range of ¯rms the M&M proposition is fairly robust to a particular class of market imper-
fections, contractual incompleteness. In our model, despite their inability to write complete
¯nancial contracts, investors are indi®erent between debt and equity in ongoing ¯rms, but
they strongly prefer one over the other in entrepreneurial startups. The intuition is again
4See Harris and Raviv (1991, 1992), Hart (1995) and Allen and Winton (1997) for comprehensive surveys
of this literature.
5Dybvig and Zender shows that the M&M proposition is valid in a large class of models with asymmetric
information. The authors' proof relies on the assumption that managerial compensation is chosen optimally.
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the interaction between the control rights of subsequent claimholders: Since the control
rights of previous security holders represent an externality for subsequent claim holders, the
marginal decision of which security to issue next becomes irrelevant once a ¯rm has su±cient
contractual complexity in place.
Since the di®erent contracts require di®erent pro¯tability thresholds for the ¯nancing of
an initial project, our theory also implies a life-cycle pattern of ¯rm ¯nancing: ¯rms will issue
outside equity, or convertible debt ¯rst, then use their retained earnings, and ¯nally issue
long-term debt or outside equity to satisfy their subsequent ¯nancing needs. Interestingly,
this pattern di®ers from the one implied by Myers's (1984) pecking order theory of ¯nance
in one important aspect: the initial ¯nancing choice of the ¯rm. Myers predicts that ¯rms
will issue debt ¯rst and outside equity only later, whereas our theory suggests that the ¯rm's
¯rst outside equity issue will precede its ¯rst public debt issue.6 Carey et al. (1993) and
Helwege and Liang (1996) presents evidence that small etrepreneurial ¯rms frequently issue
outside equity before they issue debt.
Our theory o®ers interesting implications about how ¯nancial contracts can limit man-
6This implication of our theory on the timing of debt and equity issues in small ¯rms is related to Garmaise
(1998) and Habib and Johnsen (1998). Garmaise develops a theory of small ¯rms in which investors are better
informed about the prospects of the entrepreneur's project than the entrepreneur. Given this informational
asymmetry, small ¯rms prefer to issue equity over debt. Habib and Johnsen shows that if investors are
more informed about the primary use of the ¯rm's assets than the entrepreneur, then the ¯rm will sell them
equity and alternatively, if investors are more informed about the secondary use of the ¯rm's assets, then
the ¯rm will issue debt. Unlike our paper, neither of these articles develop a theory on the sequencing of
¯rm ¯nancing.
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agerial consumption of perks. Although in our model the manager has the ability to divert
or manipulate the ¯rm's cash °ows and it is prohibitively costly to prove any managerial
wrongdoing for a third party such as a court, a variety of ¯nancial contracts can e®ectively
control the manager's appropriation of private bene¯ts in equilibrium except for ¯rms in
economic distress.7 And even though the manager will consume more perks in equilibrium
as the ¯rm grows, the managerial appropriation of private bene¯ts is less of a concern for
potential investors in ongoing ¯rms than it is in entrepreneurial startups.
Our theory advances the Jensen and Meckling and the Fama and Jensen view of the ¯rm
as a nexus of contracts. We show that as the ¯rm adds more layers of contracts, subsequent
claim holders bene¯t from the control rights of the ¯rm's existing security holders. Since
the control rights of existing security holders represent a positive externality for subsequent
claim holders, ¯rms in later stages of their life-cycle can issue contracts that investors would
reject at their initial ¯nancing stage.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 studies the
initial ¯nancing of ¯rms. Section 4 investigates the subsequent ¯nancing decisions of ¯rms.
Section 5 discusses the implications of the model for a life-cycle theory of ¯rm ¯nance.
Section 6 extends the model to incorporate covenant debt and dispersed outside equity.
Section 7 presents a theory of control changes over the ¯rm's life-cycle. Section 8 discusses
the implications of the model for asset substitution. Section 9 concludes.
7This result is consistent with Leland (1999) and Fluck (1999) who ¯nd that managerial asset substitution
only becomes a serious problem when ¯rms are in distress.
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2 The Model
We consider two ¯rms: a startup and an established, ongoing ¯rm. We model the former as
a risk-neutral entrepreneur who has no wealth and who seeks ¯nancing for a project from
risk-neutral investors. We model the latter as an enterprise that successfully operates and
¯nances its ¯rst project and seeks ¯nancing for an expansion project.
We assume that the ¯rm's initial project and the expansion project are otherwise iden-
tical. Hence at the second stage the ¯rm doubles its operation. We do so to make our point
more transparent, i.e. even in the case of identical, perfectly positively correlated projects
subsequent ¯nancing decisions may lead to di®erent security choices.
2.1 The cash °ows
The projects yield periodic operating cash °ows, ~v: The cash °ow, ~v; is an i.i.d. random
variable that takes on the values v + x > 0 and v ¡ x > 0 with equal probabilities. Each
project requires an investment outlay, I; and involves the operation of an equipment with
economic life of two periods. Both the investors and the entrepreneur use the same positive
discount factor, ±; to value future payo®s.
Each period the manager can divert the cash °ows. Each period, investors and manage-
ment both learn the true realization of the cash °ows. However, the true realization of the
cash °ows is assumed to be nonveri¯able by a third party such as a court. Hence contracts
written on cash °ows are prohibitively costly to verify in court (Grossman and Hart (1986)).
2.2 The investment decision
9
The manager can repeat the projects over and over again. As long as a project continues,
the manager can seek external ¯nancing for the replacement of the physical assets at the
beginning of each cycle, or he can renew the equipment each period by retaining some of the
earnings, a. If a is spent at time 1 and time 2, then further investment of I in period 2 can be
avoided. We assume that each investment policy is feasible, that is, v¡x ¸ a: We also assume
that these investment policies are equally costly to implement, that is, I = a± +a: Notice that
the liquidation values of the assets depend on which investment policy the manager adopts.
If the equipment is replaced every other period, then it depreciates over time and its liq-
uidation value varies from period to period. The equipment has a positive liquidation value,
L1 < ±I; if investors choose to liquidate the ¯rm's assets immediately after the investment
is sunk. Alternatively, if investors choose to liquidate the assets immediately following the
realization of period 1 cash °ows, then the equipment has a liquidation value, L2 < L1: These
liquidation values are distributed at time 1 and time 2, respectively. The salvage value of
the equipment at the end of its operation is zero.
Alternatively, if the equipment is renewed period after period, its liquidation value is
equal to L1 across periods. The equipment can be periodically renewed if all cash °ow
realizations of the project exceed the cost of the renewal, that is, if v ¡ x ¸ a:
Investors know whether or not the equipment has been renewed. This managerial invest-
ment policy is also nonveri¯able for a third party, such as a court, unless the company is
liquidated and the physical assets are foreclosed. As a general principle, in this model only
receipts of payments are veri¯able. We assume that the true realization of all other ¯nancial
10
and accounting variables are prohibitively costly to verify.
2.3 The ¯nancing decision
The entrepreneur can seek debt or equity ¯nancing from investors. In these ¯nancing
arrangements investors o®er I; the investment outlay to the manager in exchange of future
payments and contingent or unconditional control rights. Investors may be granted the right
to liquidate the assets, or the right to dismiss the manager. The ¯rm must bear a ¯xed cost
µ every time it issues a security. This cost is the same for each security the ¯rm issues.
2.3.1 The model of outside equity
We de¯ne outside equity by its claim structure, control rights and maturity. In exchange
of I the manager promises equityholders the project's cash °ows (net of the manager's private
bene¯ts of control). Holders of outside equity are granted the unconditional right to dismiss
the manager (i.e. the right to dismiss the manager regardless of the ¯rm's cash °ows or
managerial performance) or to liquidate the ¯rm's assets-in-place. Equity is issued with
inde¯nite life.8 The timing of the actions and the associated payo®s for outside equity are
8Fluck (1998) established that when cash °ows are nonveri¯able and the manager has the ability to divert
or manipulate the cash °ows, then the only outside equity that is sustainable is of unlimited life. This is
because the threat of the manager's dismissal is not a credible threat when there is a prespeci¯ed expiration
date on equity but becomes a credible threat when the equity has inde¯nite life. Her result follows from the
inability of ¯nitely-lived investment opportunities to provide the manager with an incentive not to consume
vt every period. Put simply, in the last period of the equity's life, the manager consumes vt: Firing is not a
credible threat since ¯ring is costly to the equity and the new manager has the same incentives as the old
manager. Since the manager knows she consumes vt in the last period in the next to last period the manager
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described in the next subsection.
2.3.2 The model of debt
We de¯ne debt as a contract that grants investors a ¯xed periodic payment and contin-
gent control rights. The debtholders can exercise their control rights when the ¯rm is in
default, i.e. if the manager has failed to make the agreed-upon payment.9 Upon default, the
debtholders can either forgive the manager or dismiss the manager. The debtholders can
also take over the ¯rm as a going concern (take equity), or extend the maturity of the debt
or they can liquidate the ¯rm's existing physical assets. We distinguish between liquidity
default (when the manager does not have the funds to make the payment) and strategic
default (when the manager decides to divert the funds rather than make the payment).
A debt contract may be written with a prespeci¯ed maturity, T, or with inde¯nite ma-
turity. If T exceeds the life of the ¯rm's existing physical assets (in our model it is two
periods) then we call the contract long-term debt. The debtholders' actions and their payo®-
implications are described in details in the next subsection.
2.4 The set of actions and payo®s
When no control challenge is initiated, the manager decides on the investment policy and
can consume all of vt since ¯ring again is not a credible threat.
9Alternatively, if some accounting variables were veri¯able in our model, then we could de¯ne default as
either failure to make payment or violation of a bond covenant. Our results are easily applicable to covenant
debt, since investors are frequently granted speci¯c control rights when a covenant is violated (Smith and
Warner (1979) and Kahan and Tuckman (1996)).
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then makes payments to investors. Investors receive dividends dt or debt payments pt; on
which the manager has decided, and the manager receives vt ¡ at ¡ pt (or vt ¡ at ¡ dt) or
vt ¡ pt; (or vt ¡ dt) depending on his investment policy. We denote the expected payment
debtholders (shareholders) receive by p (dt), the promised payment on debt (the equilibrium
dividends in the high state) by pv+x (dv+x) and the equilibrium debt payment the manager
pays in liquidity default (the equilibrium dividends in the low state) by pv¡x (dv¡x). We
denote the managerial equilibrium payo® by Mv+x and Mv¡x; respectively.
In the event of a dismissal, a new manager takes charge and decides on the payments,
p^t and the investment, a^t. The departing manager receives no payo®, and the equityholders
bear c; the cost associated with replacing the manager.
If the debtholders take over the ¯rm as a going concern (take equity) upon default, then
from this date onward they will be holding unconditional control rights for the inde¯nite
future and they will have a claim to a fraction of the ¯rm's cash °ows. We denote the
discounted present value of the debtholders' future payo® from the time they have taken
over the company as a going concern by Ep^
+
1¡± , which is equal to the value of the debtholders'
remaining claim (or the value of the ¯rm whichever is lower).
If the debtholders forgive the current payment and extend the maturity of the debt by
one period, then the remaining (T+1-t) payments are rescheduled to times t+1,...,T+1.10
In the event of liquidation, the manager receives no payo® and investors receive the
liquidation value of the physical assets.
10Alternatively, if the debtholders forgive but do not extend the maturity of the debt, then they simply
agree to accept one less payment.
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3 The entrepreneurial startup
There are several equilibrium ¯nancial contracts that can be issued for the ¯nancing of
entrepreneurial startups. Those that do not involve ine±cient liquidation (dismissal) in
equilibrium are Pareto-optimal. These contracts impose zero veri¯cation cost on the parties,
they involve no deadweight loss in equilibrium and the payo® of one party (investors or
management) can be improved only at the expense of the other party.
In this section, we introduce three contracts for the ¯nancing of small entrepreneurial
¯rms. These contracts are su±cient to establish that (i) investors set lower pro¯tability
thresholds for the ¯nancing of ongoing ¯rms; and that (ii) the set of equilibrium ¯nancial
contracts for ongoing ¯rms is a superset of the set of equilibrium ¯nancial contracts for
entrepreneurial startups. One of these contracts is outside equity and the other two are debt
contracts. The two debt contracts di®er in the control rights they assign to the holders.
In Section 3 we will derive conditions under which these contracts are sustainable for small
¯rms. Then in Section 4 we will revisit these contracts and show that (1) investors are
indi®erent between these contracts at a subsequent ¯nancing stage even though they are
not indi®erent at the ¯rm's initial ¯nancing stage; and (2) ongoing ¯rms can issue securities
which are never equilibrium contracts for entrepreneurial startups.
3.1 Outside equity
The ¯rst security we introduce is outside equity. Recall from Section 2.3.1 that outside
equity is a contract that promises investors a claim to the ¯rm's cash °ows, the uncondi-
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tional right to dismiss management11 or to liquidate the ¯rm's physical assets and inde¯nite
maturity. Then the following strategy-pair for the equity holders and the manager IE;ME
constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium.
For the equity holders: Equity holders do not replace the manager at ¯rst and until the
manager paid equilibrium dividends and properly maintained the ¯rm's assets12 each period.
If there is any deviation from the equilibrium, then they replace the manager next period.
For the (new) manager: The manager pays equilibrium dividends and maintains the
¯rm's assets each period. If there is any deviation from the equilibrium, then he will divert
the cash °ows for ever. 2
Investors are willing to hold outside equity if and only if (i) they can recover the outlay;
and (ii) the present value of the stream of the managerial incentive payments exceeds any
possible cash °ow realizations (if it were not the case then the manager would prefer to take
the cash °ows and face dismissal). Formally,
±d
1¡ ± ¸ I: (1)
Mv+x + ±
v ¡ d¡ a
1¡ ± ¸ v + x; (2)
11Hellmann and Puri (2000) document that venture capitalists (private equity) frequently replace en-
trepreneurs with a professional CEO if they are not satis¯ed with the ¯rm's performance.
12In the context of venture-backed startups we can reinterpret the manager not paying equilibrium divi-
dends or not properly maintaining the ¯rm's assets as the equivalent of the ¯rm not reaching key milestones
in its development.
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Mv¡x + ±
v ¡ d¡ a
1¡ ± ¸ v ¡ x: (3)
The rest of the incentive compatibility conditions are shown in Appendix A1. For c < a;
(1), (2) and (3) are necessary and su±cient conditions.
3.2 Debt contract with the right to dismiss management
In this section we introduce our ¯rst debt contract. This contract promises investors a
¯xed payment and grants them the right to dismiss the manager. Debt holders are also
granted the right to take over the ¯rm as a going concern or to extend the maturity of the
debt in the event of a default. As shown in Fluck (1999b), such a contract provides the ¯rm's
manager can be written with maturity shorter or longer than the life of the ¯rm's physical
assets.
When investors have the contingent right to dismiss management and take over the ¯rm
as a going concern, then the following strategy-pair ILT ;MLT constitutes a subgame perfect
equilibrium.
For the debt holders: (i) The debt holders replace the manager and take over the ¯rm in
a strategic default (when the manager could make the payment but would rather default)
in period t and forgive him and extend the maturity of the debt in a liquidity default (when
the manager cannot make the payment) in period t; (ii) If the manager has strategically
defaulted in period t but he has not been dismissed in this period and/or the ¯rm has not
been taken over, then the debt holders will dismiss him and will take over the ¯rm next
period regardless of the payment made; (iii) If the manager was dismissed in a liquidity
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default in period t or the ¯rm has been taken over, then the debt holders will dismiss the
new manager and will take over the ¯rm next period; (iv) If the debt holders have dismissed
the manager and have taken over the ¯rm in a liquidity default in period t, then from then
onward (i) takes e®ect; (v) If there is a liquidity default in period t and investors forgive but
do not extend the maturity of the debt, then from then onward (i) takes e®ect.
For the manager and the new manager: (a) If a (new) manager has not strategically
defaulted until period t, then he will not default in period t; (b) if the manager ¯nds himself
on the job immediately following a strategic default in period t, then he will continue to
divert the cash °ows thereafter; (c) If the manager has been replaced following a default
in period t but the company has not been taken over by the debt holders, then the new
manager will divert the cash °ows each period thereafter; (d) If the manager has been
replaced immediately following a default in period t and the company has been taken over
by the debt holders, then the new manager will not strategically default in the following
period. 2
The potential debt holders are willing to provide ¯nancing if (I) they can recover the
outlay; and (II) the present value of all future managerial incentive payments exceed any
possible cash °ow realizations (otherwise the manager would prefer to take the cash °ows
and face dismissal). Formally, 8 0 · ¿ < T
p
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ ¸ I; (4)
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Mv+x +M
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿+1 + ±T+1¡¿M1 ¸ v + x; (5)
and
Mv¡x +M
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿+1 + ±T+1¡¿M1 ¸ v ¡ x: (6)
where M1 is the period-(T+1) expected value of the manager's future payo®s once the
contract has expired.
There are two additional incentive compatibility conditions required here. Since the debt
holders can only act if the manager has failed to make the payment, a manager planning
a strategic default can also devise a two-step default strategy: In the ¯rst period he would
make the contractual payment but would milk the assets (i.e. divert a). Debt holders cannot
intervene because their right is contingent on default. Then, in the second period he would
divert all the cash °ows and default on the contractual payment.
Thus, for the manager to comply with the contract it must be the case that the present
value of all future managerial incentive payments also exceed Mv+x+a+±v and Mv¡x+a+±v;
the payo®s the manager can guarantee himself from the two-step default strategy. Formally,
Mv+x +M
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿+1 + ±T+1¡¿M1 ¸Mv+x + a+ ±v; (7)
Mv¡x +M
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿+1 + ±T+1¡¿M1 ¸Mv¡x + a+ ±v: (8)
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The remaining incentive compatibility conditions associated with the equilibrium strate-
gies are presented in Appendix A2.
3.3 Short-term debt with liquidation rights
Alternatively, the manager can also promise investors a ¯xed payment and grant them
the right to liquidate the ¯rm's physical assets in default. This debt contract was introduced
in Hart and Moore (1989).
The authors demonstrated that the maximum the manager can be induced to pay in this
contract is the smaller of the period 1 and the period 2 cash °ows in present value terms.
In period 1 the entrepreneur cannot pay more than the current cash °ows (liquidity default)
and will not pay more than his valuation of the cash °ows in period 2 (strategic default).
Thus, the entrepreneur may default when realized cash °ows are low and he is unable to
make the payment. He may also default when current cash °ows are high and future cash
°ows are low. In this case he could pay but he would rather default.
Since the debt holders can only assure a payment that is the smaller of (i) the present
value of the future cash °ows for the entrepreneur and (ii) the current cash °ows plus the
maximal amount that can be raised by liquidating the ¯rm's physical assets so that the cash
°ows from the remaining assets make the entrepreneur-manager just indi®erent to transfer
the current cash °ows as payment, the debt-¯nancing condition will take the following form:
±E(min
½
±~v2;max
½
~v1; ~v1 +
µ
1¡ ~v1
±~v2
±L2
¶¾¾
) ¸ I: (9)
This inequality places an upper bound on the variability of the project's cash °ows.
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Investors are willing to write such a contract only if x, the variability of the project's cash
°ows does not exceed xd(v; I; L2; ±); the value of x that solves (9) for equality.
In a two-period model, Hart and Moore (1989) showed that this contract can only be writ-
ten for one period and that two-period debt contracts are not sustainable. This is because
by the end of period 2 the ¯rm's assets become worthless for both the entrepreneur and the
investors. Since the investors cannot stop the entrepreneur to start a new ¯rm and/or can-
not seize the entrepreneur's future investment opportunities (because of the entrepreneur's
limited liability), liquidation is no longer a threat when the assets are fully depreciated and
the entrepreneur will not make any payment to the investors in period 2.13
Fluck (1998) generalized the above discussed result for the case when the ¯rm's growth
opportunities have inde¯nite life. She shows that when investors are promised a ¯xed pay-
ment and the right to liquidate the ¯rm's physical assets in default, then in longer term debt
contracts the entrepreneur can always bene¯t from skipping the investment and defaulting
when the ¯rm's assets are fully depreciated and the liquidation rights are worthless.
13Similar conclusion was reached in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990). In their model of two period projects,
the projects require new outlay each period. The only right the investors have is to deny funding for the
entrepreneur's next project. Since in the second period the projects will be over and the investors cannot
enforce any payment from the managers, at the end of period 1 no investor would provide new funding
for any period-2 project. In equilibrium the investors and the entrepreneur agree to a two-period contract
in which the investors automatically provide the entrepreneur with new funds in the second period (even
though it is not subgame perfect for them to do so) unless default occurs in the ¯rst period. This contract
will induce the entrepreneur to make payment at the end of the ¯rst period but he will always default in the
second period.
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To illustrate that the manager can indeed bene¯t from breaching any contract with
maturity T ¸ 2 and can raise ¯nancing for a new ¯rm following the liquidation of the assets
of his old enterprise, consider a debt contract with maturity T > 2: Such a contract requires
the periodic renewal of the ¯rm's assets. First consider the marginal project with respect to
this contract, one that is just able to provide the managerial incentive payments in addition
to returning the outlay and providing for the renewal of the assets.
A necessary condition for the manager to comply with the contract is that there exist
(Mv¡x;Mv+x) such that
Mv¡x + ±
M
(1¡ ±) ¸ v ¡ x; (10)
Mv+x + ±
M
(1¡ ±) ¸ v + x: (11)
A necessary condition for this marginal project to meet debt payments is
I ·
TX
t=1
±tp+ ±T I: (12)
The ¯rst term on the right side is the sum of the payments to investors that can be met
in any period. The second term is the extra payment (the equivalent of the depreciation
account) that can be made during the last cycle when the need for internal ¯nancing is over.
Reorganizing this condition, we get
I · ±p
1¡ ± (13)
21
that will hold as equality for our marginal project. Notice that (13) is the equivalent of (1).
Consequently, (1), (10) and (11) are necessary conditions to raise any (o®-equilibrium)
debt with maturity T > 2 for our marginal project. They are also su±cient conditions to
raise outside equity for the marginal project. Thus, the entrepreneur can always guarantee
outside equity ¯nancing for his marginal project following a default on a debt contract with
maturity T > 2: Obviously, any project that is more pro¯table than the marginal project
is also able to raise outside equity. Consequently, the entrepreneur can always bene¯t from
defaulting on a debt contract with maturity T > 2 in period 2, starting a new ¯rm and
¯nancing it with outside equity. As a result, such a debt contract is never an equilibrium
contract for startups.
3.4 Pro¯tability constraints:
Whenever L2 < v ¡ x; then (9) implies (1), (2) and (3). In other words, if a project can
raise short-term debt by o®ering investors the right to liquidate the ¯rm's physical assets
then it can also raise outside equity but not vice versa. It follows from Section 3.3 that if
either (7) or (8) fails to hold then the entrepreneur cannot raise debt by granting investors
the right to dismiss management and to take over the ¯rm as a going concern or to extend
the maturity of the debt but it may still be able to raise outside equity. Moreover, a debt
contract which grants the holders the right to liquidate the ¯rm's physical assets and matures
in T ¸ 2 periods is never an equilibrium contract for startups.
From now on we will assume that the project's cash °ows satisfy (1), (2) and (3) but
fail (9) and either (7) or (8). Under these conditions a startup ¯rm cannot raise debt but it
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can issue outside equity to ¯nance its project. This happens if a ¯rm has signi¯cant growth
opportunities but little assets-in-place. The rest of the paper will focus on the ¯nancing
choice of ¯rms whose initial project is ¯nanced by outside equity.
4 The ongoing ¯rm
Recall that in our model the ¯rm's expansion project is identical to and is perfectly positively
correlated with its initial project. Thus, when starting the new project, the ¯rm doubles its
existing operation. We will show that this second project can be ¯nanced by debt even if
the ¯rm could not raise debt ¯nancing for its initial project.
4.1 The pro¯tability threshold for ¯nancing the expansion project
Recall from our earlier discussion on startups in Section 3.2 that when the ¯rm is ¯nanced
by long-term debt, the manager has access to more pro¯table default strategies than when
the ¯rm is ¯nanced by equity. In order to prevent strategic default, long-term debt contracts
must o®er the manager higher incentive payments. As a consequence, creditors will only
¯nance the project if (7) and (8) also holds in addition to (1), (2) and (3).
Interestingly, however, this conclusion does not necessarily carry over to larger ongoing
¯rms. The reasoning is as follows. In case of a large ¯rm the ¯rm already successfully
operates and ¯nances one project. Outside equity holders are willing to supply the initial
¯nancing for the ¯rm's original project, since their threat of dismissal provides the manager
with su±cient incentives to comply with the contract and to properly maintain project 1's
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assets. When the ¯rm expands and debt is issued to ¯nance the new project, then the
potential debt holders will take into consideration the managerial incentives provided by
outside equity. In particular, if holders of a subsequent debt issue can count on existing
equity holders to dismiss the manager whenever he fails to renew project 2's assets, then a
strategic default in the large company will not yield the manager more than the current cash
°ows of the ¯rm and hence the debt holders would be willing to ¯nance the ¯rm's expansion
project even if (7) and (8) fail to hold.
Whether or not debt holders can rely on equity holders to enforce their claim depends on
the priority of their claims. If debt holders can take over the operation of both projects (up
to the value of their claim), then the equity holders will guard the debt holders' investment,
because their interests will coincide in equilibrium. Equity holders would do so even if they
do not expect any cash °ows from the second project (i.e. even if all cash °ows above the
debt payments and depreciation accrue to the manager as private bene¯ts) because otherwise
they will lose their dividends from project 1.
Alternatively, if the debt holders can take over the second project only (project ¯nance)14
and the equity holders do not expect any dividends from the second project (since all cash
°ows above the debt payments and depreciation accrue to the manager as private bene¯ts),
14In a model of complete ¯nancial contracts Berkovitch and Kim (1990) shows that project ¯nance is
optimal in reducing managerial incentives for under- and overinvestment. In our model of incomplete ¯nancial
contracting incentives for managerial overinvestments are not present. Here granting debt seniority can
achieve more than project ¯nance can: issuing senior debt enables large ¯rms to raise debt ¯nancing for
projects that small ¯rms cannot.
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then the debt holders cannot rely on the equity holders to protect their interest. In the latter
case the manager must be given higher incentive payments to comply with the contract and
to properly maintain the ¯rm's assets. Hence potential debt holders will make the same
¯nancing decision for ongoing ¯rms and startups. Proposition 1 summarizes the result.
Proposition 1 Suppose that a ¯rm successfully operates one project and ¯nances it by out-
side equity. Suppose furthermore that the ¯rm seeks to ¯nance its second project by issuing
debt. Then, if the debt holders are granted the right to dismiss the manager and take over the
¯rm (the operation of both project 1 and project 2 up to the value of their claim) as a going
concern in default, then they would be willing to hold debt whenever c < a and p satis¯es (1),
(2) and (3). Alternatively, if the debt holders are granted only the right to take over project 2
as a going concern in default and if equity holders do not expect any cash °ows from project
2 in equilibrium (i.e. all cash °ows above the debt payments and depreciation accrue to the
manager), then the manager can not raise debt unless conditions (7) and (8) hold.
The corresponding equilibrium strategies can be obtained by combining IE; ILT ;ME and
MLT . In this equilibrium the equity holders will dismiss the manager if the manager has
failed to maintain project 2's assets. The debtholders's action will depend on whether or
not the equityholders have dismissed the manager for failing to maintain the ¯rm's assets
prior to default. In particular, the debt holders' equilibrium strategy will specify to forgive
and extend the maturity of the debt in a default that resulted from the manager's failure to
maintain the ¯rm's assets if the manager has been dismissed by the equity holders by the
time default has taken place. In contrast the debt holders' equilibrium strategy will specify
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to dismiss the manager and to take over the ¯rm as a going concern had the manager stayed
on. Formally,
For the equity holders: Equity holders do not replace the manager at ¯rst and until the
manager paid equilibrium dividends and properly maintained the ¯rm's assets each period.
If there is any deviation from the equilibrium, then they replace the manager next period.
For the debt holders: (i) The debt holders replace the manager and take over the ¯rm in
a strategic default and in any default that resulted from or is accompanied by the current
manager's failure to maintain the ¯rm's assets. The debt holders will forgive the manager
and extend the maturity of the debt in a liquidity default and in any default that resulted
from the previous manager's failure to maintain the ¯rms' assets; (ii) If the manager has
strategically defaulted in period t or if the manager has defaulted in period t but has failed to
maintain the ¯rms' assets and he has not been dismissed and/or the ¯rm has not been taken
over, then the debtholders will dismiss the manager and will take over the ¯rm next period
regardless of the payment made; (iii) If the manager was dismissed or if the ¯rm has been
taken over in a liquidity default in period t or in any default that resulted from the previous
manager's failure to maintain the ¯rms' assets, then the debt holders will dismiss the new
manager and will take over the ¯rm next period; (iv) If the debt holders have dismissed the
manager and have taken over the ¯rm in a liquidity default in period t or in any default that
resulted from the previous manager's failure to maintain the ¯rms' assets, then from then
onward (i) takes e®ect; (v) If there is a liquidity default in period t or a default that resulted
from the previous manager's failure to maintain the ¯rms' assets and the debt holders forgive
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but do not extend the maturity of the debt, then from then onward (i) takes e®ect.
For the manager and the new manager: (a) The (new) manager will pay equilibrium
dividends and maintain the ¯rm's assets at ¯rst; (b) If a (new) manager has paid equilibrium
dividends and maintained the ¯rm's assets each period and has not strategically defaulted
until period t, then he will continue to pay equilibrium dividends, will maintain the ¯rm's
assets and will not strategically default in period t; (c) If there is any deviation by any party
from the equilibrium, then the (new) manager will divert the cash °ows for ever. 2
Interestingly, the corresponding incentive compatibility conditions for the debtholders
will coincide with those for outside equity. In particular, (7) and (8) do not have to be
satis¯ed for a large ¯rm to obtain debt ¯nancing. This is so because, given the equilibrium
strategies of the equityholders, the manager can no longer guarantee himself Mv+x + a+ ±v
or Mv¡x + a+ ±v when he plans a strategic default (he knows he will be replaced right after
he diverts a). The most the manager can pocket in a strategic default is v; which is the same
that he can guarantee himself o®-the-equilibrium-path in an all-equity ¯rm. The incentive
compatibility conditions associated with the equilibrium strategies above are presented in
Appendix A4.
Thus, a key implication of Proposition 1 is that an ongoing ¯rm can obtain debt ¯nancing
for the same project that a startup cannot. Furthermore, the conditions investors set for
the debt or outside equity ¯nancing of a ¯rm's expansion project are identical. Hence when
¯nancing the ¯rm's expansion project investors are indi®erent between debt and equity, even
though these same investors frequently prefer to hold outside equity over debt in startups.
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This implies that despite the investors' inability to write complete ¯nancial contracts, the
Modigliani and Miller (1958) result on the irrelevance of the ¯nancing choice does hold for
ongoing ¯rms in our model, but it fails to hold for entrepreneurial startups. The intuition
lies in the interaction between the control rights of subsequent claim holders. Since the con-
trol rights of previous security holders represent a positive externality for subsequent claim
holders, therefore the marginal decision of which security to issue next becomes irrelevant
once a ¯rm has su±cient contractual complexity in place.
It is important to emphasize that the debtholders' "collateral" (the value they can fore-
close in default) does not even appear in the managerial incentive compatibility conditions
(7) and (8). Hence it is not the increase in the value of the collateral that is driving the
result (the increase in the value of the collateral appears only in the debtholders' incentive
compatibility conditions o®-the-equilibrium path). Potential debtholders are more willing to
¯nance ongoing companies because in these ¯rms they can rely on the control rights of the
¯rms' existing security holders.
It is worth to highlight that the second part of the proposition gives rise to an un-
derinvestment problem that is closely related to Myers's debt overhang problem. In both
scenarios equity holders choose to pass up valuable investment opportunities when all the
bene¯ts would accrue to debt holders. In Myers (1977) the manager (who himself is the
equity holder) decides not to invest because returns from the investment will only bene¯t
the debt holders. In the present model, because the manager would bene¯t from the invest-
ment but cannot commit to periodically renew the assets, some projects will fail to obtain
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¯nancing. Equity holders are willing to induce management to properly maintain the new
investment's assets but only if their interest coincides with those of the debt holders. When
this is not the case, then debt holders will refuse the ¯nancing of project 2.
4.2 The set of equilibrium contracts
In this subsection we will show that ongoing ¯rms can also sustain contracts that are
never equilibrium contracts for startups. In particular, we will show that larger ongoing ¯rms
can issue longer-term debt by granting investors liquidation rights. Recall from Section 3.3
that these are o®-equilibrium contracts for startups (Section 3.3). These contracts further
strengthen our result on the irrelevance of the ¯nancing choice.
To see the intuition, suppose that the entrepreneur issues debt with maturity T > 2 by
promising investors the right to liquidate the ¯rm's physical assets in default. It follows from
our earlier discussion in Section 3.3 that for the ¯nancing of a startup ¯rm investors would
refuse to hold this contract. Since the value of the assets the debt holders can foreclose (and
thereby the debt holders' bargaining position) depends on the manager's decision whether
or not to maintain these assets, it is in the the manager's best interest to default in period
2 by depleting the ¯rm's assets and leaving an empty shell. By doing so, the manager will
take a in the ¯rst period and will divert the second period cash °ows, v.
This conclusion, however, does not carry over to subsequent ¯nancing decisions. If the
¯rm's second project is ¯nanced by debt and debt has priority (i.e. if debt holders have the
right to liquidate both project 1's and project 2's assets up to the value of their claim), then
the equity holders will discipline the manager as soon as the he skips the investment. The
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equityholders would act to protect their own investment directly (project 1's assets) and
indirectly by protecting the interest of the debt holders (project 2's assets). Since equity
holders have residual control they can discipline the manager as soon as the manager skips
the investment, so the manager will be replaced before he is able to deplete the ¯rm's assets.
Once a new manager is hired to run the company, the value of the old manager's outside
option to start a replica of his old company will diminish. Thus, the maximum the manager
can guarantee himself by strategically defaulting in the large company is the current cash
°ows of the ¯rm. But since (2) and (3) are satis¯ed (by the very fact that the ¯rm was able
to raise outside equity in the ¯rst place), i.e. 8vt = v+x; v¡x : Mvt + ± M1¡± ¸ vt; therefore,
it is not pro¯table for the manager to strategically default if the most he can guarantee
himself from default is vt; the current cash °ows of the ¯rm. Proposition 2 summarizes this
result.
Proposition 2 Suppose that a ¯rm successfully operates one project and ¯nances it by out-
side equity. Suppose furthermore that the ¯rm seeks to ¯nance its second project by issuing
debt. Then, if the debt holders are granted the right to liquidate both project 1's and project
2's assets in default (up to the value of their claim), then they would be willing to hold debt
whenever c < a and (1), (2) and (3) hold for p. Alternatively, if the debt holders are granted
the right to liquidate only project 2's assets in default and if the equity holders do not expect
any cash °ows from project 2 (i.e. all cash °ows above the debt payments and depreciation
accrue to the manager in equilibrium), then the debt holders will not ¯nance the project
unless condition (9) holds.
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The equilibrium strategies associated with Proposition 2 are presented below.
For the equity holders: Equity holders do not replace the manager at ¯rst and until the
manager paid equilibrium dividends and properly maintained the ¯rm's assets each period. If
there is any deviation from the equilibrium, then the equityholders will replace the manager
next period.
For the debt holders: (i) The debt holders will liquidate the ¯rm's physical assets upon
default (with the most valuable assets ¯rst, up to the value of their claim), if the manager has
not been replaced in the period following (1) a strategic default; or (2) the manager's failure to
renew any of the ¯rm's physical assets. Otherwise, the debt holders will forgive the manager
and extend the maturity of the debt in default; (ii) If the manager has not been dismissed
in the period following (1) or (2) above and the debtholders have not liquidated, then the
debtholders will liquidate the ¯rm's assets next period regardless of the payment made; (iii)
If the ¯rm's assets were partially liquidated in default in period t and the debtholders still
have outstanding claim, then the debt holders will liquidate the ¯rm's assets next period
regardless of payment made; (iv) If the equilibrium strategy speci¯ed the debt holders to
forgive the manager and to extend the maturity of the debt and the debt holders forgave the
manager, but did not extend the maturity of the debt, then next period onward (i) takes
e®ect.
For the manager and the new manager: (a) The (new) manager pays equilibrium divi-
dends and maintains the ¯rm's assets at ¯rst; (b) If a (new) manager has paid equilibrium
dividends and maintained the ¯rm's assets each period and has not strategically defaulted
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until period t, then he will continue to pay equilibrium dividends, will maintain the ¯rm's
assets and will not strategically default in period t; (c) If there is any deviation by any party
from the equilibrium, then the (new) manager will divert the cash °ows for ever. 2
The incentive compatibility conditions associated with the equilibrium strategies are
presented in Appendix A4. As it is shown there, the incentive compatibility conditions are
the same whether the ¯rm's expansion project is ¯nanced by debt or outside equity.
A key implication of Proposition 2 is that even the set of equilibrium contracts di®ers
in di®erent stages of a ¯rm's life cycle: some contracts which are never sustainable at the
initial ¯nancing stage become sustainable at a subsequent ¯nancing stage. The intuition is
again the stage-dependency of the control rights of subsequent claim holders: in addition to
their own rights, holders of subsequent security issues may also rely on the ¯rm's existing
investors to enforce their claims. Whether or not they can do so, depends on the priority
structure of the claims.
Interestingly, however, the reverse of this statement is not true: If a contract can be
sustained for the ¯nancing of a startup, it can always be sustained for the ¯nancing of an
ongoing ¯rm. Furthermore, since it follows from Proposition 2 that the debt and outside
equity ¯nancing conditions are the same for ongoing ¯rms (provided that the debt claim has
priority over equity), investors are indi®erent between ¯nancing the ¯rm's expansion project
with debt or equity. Thus the ¯nancing choice is irrelevant for ongoing ¯rms, even though it
is relevant for entrepreneurial startups. As a consequence, the simplest debt contract that
the manager can issue for the ¯nancing of project 2 is a one-period debt that is periodically
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rolled over. Even though this contract is not an equilibrium contract for startups, it becomes
an equilibrium contract for ongoing ¯rms.
5 Implications for a life-cycle theory of ¯rm ¯nance
One of the implications of our model is that investors set di®erent pro¯tability thresholds
for the ¯nancing of ¯rms' initial and subsequent projects. The presence of these di®erent
thresholds implies a life-cycle pattern of ¯rm ¯nancing: ¯rms can issue di®erent securities
at di®erent stages of their life-cycles. In particular, our theory predicts that ¯rms with
signi¯cant growth options (and little assets-in-place) will issue outside equity or convertible
debt ¯rst. These ¯rms will then use their retained earnings, and ¯nally will issue longer-
term debt or outside equity to satisfy their subsequent ¯nancing needs. This prediction is
consistent with Kaplan and StrÄomberg (1999) who documents on a sample of venture capital
¯nanced startups that these ¯rms use ¯nanical contracts that grant all the control to the
investors at their initial ¯nancing stage.
Interestingly, the life-cycle pattern of ¯nancing that our theory predicts di®ers from the
one implied by Myers's (1984) pecking order theory of ¯nance in one important aspect: the
initial ¯nancing choice of the ¯rm. Myers predicts that ¯rms will issue debt ¯rst and outside
equity only later, whereas our theory suggests that ¯rms will frequently use outside equity
¯nancing (such as venture capital or private equity) before they use any debt ¯nance.
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6 Priority of the claims
So far we assumed that the subsequently issued ¯nancial claim has full priority over the
previously issued claim. In this section we will show that subsequent claimholders can
bene¯t from the control rights of the previous securityholders even if they share priority: i.e.
if the initial claim has priority in some states of the world and the subsequent claim in other
states of the world.
6.1 Covenant Debt
The basic model focused on the subsequent ¯nancing decisions of ¯rms whose initial
¯nancing is provided by private equity. The model can be extended to incorporate ¯rms
whose initial ¯nancing is private debt with extensive covenants. While private debt generally
relies on a variety of covenants, most public debt issues lack any protective covenant in
practice (Kahan and Tuckman (1996)).
A direct application of our Proposition 1 would suggest that if public debt holders' claim is
senior to those of private debt holders then the public debt holders can rely on their private
counterparts to protect their interest, but if it is strictly junior they cannot. In practice
private debt is typically senior to public debt. However, violation of absolute priority is
common in Chapter 11 and private debt restructurings in practice (see for example Kalay
and Zender (1995)). If future violation of absolute priority is anticipated by private debt
holders, they will be willing to act so as to protect the total value of the debt claims and
thereby the interests of public bondholders. If this is the case, then our model predicts that
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bonds would be cheaper to issue in companies that have private debt outstanding than in
those that do not.
6.2 IPOs
Until now we have assumed that the controlling equity holder stays with the ¯rm when
the next stage of ¯nancing approaches. Interestingly, this does not have to be the case. Our
results hold even if the controlling equity holder sells his stake in an IPO to dispersed outside
equity.
Evidence shows that even though dispersed outside equity holders have di±culty in coor-
dinating their control challenge against the manager, they do succeed occasionally (Strickland
et al. (1996)). Hence one way to model dispersed outside equity is as a group of investors who
has di±culty to coordinate: They can succeed only with some probability p (Fluck (1999)).
According to this view, dispersed outsiders can successfully challenge the manager but it
may take them much longer to win. But since their right is unconditional, dispersed outside
equity can potentially punish the manager for milking the ¯rm's assets.
Our next step is to incorporate dispersed outside equity into our model. Suppose that the
manager of a publicly held ¯rm (with dispersed outside equity) issues debt for the ¯nancing
of the ¯rm's expansion project. Then the maximum the manager can guarantee himself by
strategic default is Mv+x + a + (1 ¡ p)±v. This is more than what the manager can gain
from defaulting if the project is ¯nanced by private equity (vt) but less than what he can
get if there is no outside equity issued (Mv+x + a + ±v as described in Section 3.2). This
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implies that potential debt holders bene¯t from the presence of dispersed outside equity,
since the latter reduces the expected pro¯t the manager can make when he strategically
defaults. Consequently, the incentive payments the manager has to be paid in equilibrium
will be less than in the case of pure debt ¯nance. Thus the presence of dispersed outside
equity makes creditors more willing to provide subsequent ¯nancing in publicly held ¯rms
than to provide initial ¯nancing in otherwise identical startups.
7 A life-cycle theory of control
The prediction of our model is consistent with Kaplan and StrÄomberg (1999) who document
that venture capital ¯nanced companies grant strong control to investors at their initial
¯nancing stage and as time goes on the investor will give up control in the good state but will
take control in the bad state. In our model of a ¯rm with substantial growth opportunities
(and with little assets-in-place) the ¯rm's initial project is ¯nanced by investors who are
granted unconditional rights, so all the control is given to the investors at ¯rst. If these
investors want to exit, they can do so if the ¯rm is doing well. In this case they can sell
out to dispersed outside equity and the rest of the ¯rm's operation can be ¯nanced by debt.
Consistent with Aghion and Blton (1992) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), the resulting
¯nancial structure will leave control with the manager in the good state and with the investor
in the bad state.
For the venture capitalist to exit via an IPO, in our model it must be the case that the
project is su±ciently pro¯table, i.e. the expected cash °ows of the ¯rm are substantially
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higher than the venture capitalist's initial investment. If this is the case, the price dispersed
outside equity holders (who can enforce less from management than private equity) are willing
to pay would provide attractive return on the venture capitalist's investment. Even though
the venture capitalist can enforce more from the manager than dispersed outside equity if
he continues to stay with the ¯rm, he would prefer to exit if his outside opportunities yield
more than this value-di®erential.15 This assumption on the pro¯tability of ventures that go
public is in line with empirical evidence reported in Gompers(1995). According to Gompers
the only ¯rms that VCs take public are those with attractive pro¯tability prospects. If the
project is not su±ciently pro¯table, then in our model the initial ¯nancier can only sell part
of his stake and will keep part of the control.
This implication of the model also provides a rationale for ¯rms to use both debt and
(dispersed) outside equity ¯nancing. Equity is needed because debt relies on the positive
externality that the control rights of dispersed outside equity represent and would not be
willing to provide ¯nancing in the absence of equity ¯nance. On the other hand, dispersed
outside equity can enforce relatively little from the manager, therefore, they may not be
willing to come up with the investment outlay that is needed for the expansion project, so
some expansion projects with higher outlay will have to be partially ¯nanced by debt.
This theory also implies that in countries where the legal protection of shareholders is
weak and dispersed investors can enforce very little from managers, companies will have
di±culty to obtain outside equity ¯nancing from small investors (La Porta et al.(1997a,
15In practice, venture capitalists must exit the companies they ¯nance within a few years. This is because
the venture capital funds themselves have very short lives.
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1997b)). Our model suggests that this constraint will be most binding in the second stage
of ¯nancing. At the initial ¯nancing stage entrepreneurs may obtain ¯nancing from wealthy
individuals in exchange for a large stake in their companies, or by groups or by relatives and
family members. But in countries where shareholders' legal protection is weak, there will be
no way for these ¯nanciers to exit unless another wealthy individual or concentrated owner
is willing to buy their stake in the ¯rm. This implication is consistent with La Porta et al.
(1997a, 1997b) who ¯nd a negative relationship between shareholders' legal protection and
the number of IPOs across countries.
8 Asset substitution
It is worth to mention that in our model asset substitution by managers and equityholders is
not a problem except for ¯rms in distress. To see this, let us extend the model and suppose
that the manager has two investment strategies one which produces higher NPV with lower
variance and another which produces lower NPV and higher variance for the ¯rm. In this
model it is an equilibrium strategy for the debt holder to extend the maturity of the debt in
liquidity default if investment 1 is implemented, but dismiss the manager and take over the
¯rm as a going concern or dismiss the manager and liquidate the assets if investment 2 is
implemented. As long as the manager's incentive compatibility conditions hold, the manager
would prefer to stay away from investment 2 (and so would the equity holders). When the
managerial incentive compatibility conditions fail to hold, then the ¯rm can sustain neither
debt nor equity and this is when the manager will switch to investment 2. This occurs only
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when the ¯rm is in distress. It is straightforward to see that the above described equilibrium
weakly dominates all other equilibria in the sense of Gale and Hellwig (1985).
9 Conclusion
This paper develops a dynamic capital structure theory to explain why small ¯rms have
di®erent capital structure from large ¯rms. In a model of optimal ¯nancial contracting we
show that the initial and subsequent ¯nancing decisions of the same ¯rm will lead to di®erent
security choices.
The ¯rm's ¯nancing decisions will di®er in two respect. First, there will be equilibrium
contracts that investors would reject for some small ¯rm, but accept them for an otherwise
identical large ¯rm (i.e. when the two ¯rms have identical projects). Secondly, even the
set of the equilibrium ¯nancial contracts di®ers in di®erent stages of the ¯rm's life cycle:
some contracts which are never sustainable as an initial contract for a small ¯rm become
sustainable for large ¯rms. The reason is the stage-dependency of the control rights of subse-
quent claim holders: the control rights of previous security holders represent an externality
for subsequent claim holders. In addition to their own rights, holders of subsequent security
issues may also rely on the ¯rm's existing investors to enforce their claims. Whether or not
they can do so, depends on the priority structure of the claims.
Appendix
A1. The remaining incentive compatibility conditions for equity:
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Equityholders are better o® repeating the project and replacing the manager following
the manager's failure to pay equilibrium dividends and/or to renew the ¯rm's assets than
repeating the project and keeping the manager, that is,
d^v+x ¡ c + ±d^1¡ ± ¡ a ¸ ¡a; (14)
d^v¡x ¡ c + ±d^1¡ ± ¡ a ¸ ¡a: (15)
Equityholders are better o® repeating the project and replacing the manager following
the manager's failure to pay equilibrium dividends and/or to renew the ¯rm's assets than
abandoning the project, that is,
d^v+x ¡ c+ ±d^1¡ ± ¡ a ¸ 0; (16)
d^v¡x ¡ c+ ±d^1¡ ± ¡ a ¸ 0: (17)
Assuming that the new manager pays the same equilibrium dividends as his predecessor
does, condition (1) is su±cient for conditions (14){(17) to hold for every c < a: 2
A2. The remaining incentive compatibility conditions for debt when the debt holders are
granted the right to dismiss management and take over the ¯rm as a going concern in default:
The debt holders are willing to keep the manager and extend the maturity of the debt
following a liquidity default rather than dismiss him and extend the maturity of the debt if
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8 0 · ¿ < T
T+1X
t=¿+1
±t¡¿p ¸ ¡c+
T+1X
t=¿+1
±tp^ (18)
The debt holders will keep the manager and extend the maturity of the debt following a
liquidity default rather than dismiss the manager and take over the company if 8 0 · ¿ < T
T+1X
t=¿+1
±t¡¿p ¸ ¡c+ Ep^
+
1¡ ± : (19)
The debt holders are willing to dismiss the manager, provide I and write a new debt
contract for the renewal of the assets and take equity in exchange for their remaining claim
following a strategic default at time ¿;16 rather than keep him and re¯nance the project or
keep him and do nothing if 8 0 · ¿ < T
¡I +
T+¿X
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ p^+
Ep^+
1¡ ± ¡ c ¸ ¡I; (20)
¡I +
T+¿X
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ p^+
Ep^+
1¡ ± ¡ c ¸ 0: (21)
The incoming manager is willing to make payments and to periodically renew the assets
if the debt holders have taken over the company at the time of his arrival and if he has not
strategically defaulted since, if
16It is su±cient to consider only the two-step default strategy here, since this strategy makes the investors
worst o®.
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M^v+x + M^
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ + ±T¡¿+1M^1 ¸ v + x (22)
M^v¡x + M^
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ + ±T¡¿+1M^1 ¸ v ¡ x (23)
M^v+x + M^
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ + ±T¡¿+1M^1 ¸ M^v+x + a+ ±v (24)
M^v¡x + M^
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ + ±T¡¿+1M^1 ¸ M^v+x + a+ ±v: (25)
Given that the debt holders will dismiss the manager following a strategic default and will
keep dismissing him thereafter, the manager will keep diverting the cash °ows each period
following a strategic default since v + x ¸Mv+xandv ¡ x ¸Mv¡x:
Given that the debt holders will dismiss the manager if the ¯rm has been taken over
following a liquidity default, the manager will divert the cash °ows next period since v+x ¸
Mv+x and v ¡ x ¸Mv¡x:
Given that investors will dismiss the new manager if the ¯rm has not been taken over
following a default, the new manager will divert the cash °ows next period v + x ¸ M^v+x
and v ¡ x ¸ M^v¡x: 2
A3. Incentive compatibility conditions associated with Proposition 1:
The equity holders are willing to provide the ¯nancing of project 1 if (1) holds.
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The equityholders are willing to dismiss the manager following the manager's failure to
pay equilibrium dividends and/or to renew project 1's assets if (14){(17) hold.
The equityholders are willing to dismiss the manager following the manager's failure to
renew project 2's assets, since
d^v+x ¡ c+ ±d^1¡ ± ¸ 0; (26)
d^v¡x ¡ c+ ±d^1¡ ± ¸ 0: (27)
The equityholders are willing to dismiss the manager following the manager's failure to
renew project 1's and project 2's assets, since
d^v+x ¡ c¡ a+ ±d^1¡ ± ¸ 0; (28)
d^v¡x ¡ c¡ a+ ±d^1¡ ± ¸ 0: (29)
The debt holders are willing to provide ¯nancing for project 2 if (1) holds for p:
The debt holders are willing to extend the maturity of the debt in a liquidity default
rather than dismiss the manager and take over the ¯rm, since
T+1X
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ p^ ¸ ±
2Ep^+
1¡ ± ¡ ±c¡ ±a (30)
The debt holders are willing to extend the maturity of the debt in any default that
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resulted from the previous manager's failure to renew the ¯rm's assets and/or taking the
cash °ows rather than take over the ¯rm, since
T^X
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ p^¡ a ¸ ±
2Ep^+
1¡ ± ¡ ±c¡ ±a (31)
where T^ is such that
PT^
t=¿+1 ±t¡¿ p^ =
±Ep^+
1¡± + a:
In case of a default, the debt holders are willing to dismiss the manager and to take
over the ¯rm as a going concern (up to the value of their claim) if the manager has not
been dismissed in the period following (1) a strategic default; or (2) the manager's failure to
renew any of the ¯rm's physical assets, since
±Ep^+
1¡ ± + a¡ c¡ a ¸ 0
The manager is willing to comply with debt and equity if
Mv+x +M
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿+1 + ±T+1¡¿M1 ¸ v + x; (32)
and
Mv¡x +M
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿+1 + ±T+1¡¿M1 ¸ v ¡ x: (33)
Given that the debt holders will dismiss the manager following a strategic default and
will keep dismissing him thereafter, the manager will keep diverting the cash °ows each
period following a strategic default or the manager's failure to renew the ¯rm's assets, since
v + x ¸Mv+x and v ¡ x ¸Mv¡x:
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It is straightforward to see that c < a and (1), (2) and (3) are su±cient for the rest of
the conditions to hold.2
A4. Incentive compatibility conditions associated with Proposition 2:
The equity holders are willing to provide the ¯nancing of project 1 if (1) holds.
The equityholders are willing to dismiss the manager following the manager's failure to
pay equilibrium dividends and/or to renew project 1's assets if (14){(17) hold.
The equityholders are willing to dismiss the manager following the manager's failure to
renew project 2's assets, since
d^v+x ¡ c+ ±d^1¡ ± ¸ 0; (34)
d^v¡x ¡ c+ ±d^1¡ ± ¸ 0: (35)
The equityholders are willing to dismiss the manager following the manager's failure to
renew project 1's and project 2's assets, since
d^v+x ¡ c¡ a+ ±d^1¡ ± ¸ 0; (36)
d^v¡x ¡ c¡ a+ ±d^1¡ ± ¸ 0: (37)
The debt holders are willing to provide ¯nancing for project 2 if (1) holds.
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The debt holders are willing to extend the maturity of the debt in a liquidity default
rather than liquidate the ¯rm's assets, since
T+1X
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ p^ ¸ minf
T+1X
t=¿+1
±t¡¿p; 2L g (38)
where L = L1; L2; L2 + a:
The debt holders are willing to extend the maturity of the debt in any default that
resulted from the previous manager's failure to renew the ¯rm's assets and/or taking the
cash °ows rather than liquidate the ¯rm's assets, since
T+1X
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ p^¡ a ¸ minf
T+1X
t=¿+1
±t¡¿p; 2L2 g (39)
In case of a default, the debt holders are willing to liquidate the ¯rm's physical assets
(with the most valuable assets ¯rst, up to the value of their claim) if the manager has not
been dismissed in the period following (1) a strategic default; or (2) the manager's failure to
renew any of the ¯rm's physical assets, since L ¸ 0:
The manager is willing to comply with debt and equity if
Mv+x +M
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿+1 + ±T+1¡¿M1 ¸ v + x; (40)
and
Mv¡x +M
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿+1 + ±T+1¡¿M1 ¸ v ¡ x: (41)
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Given that the debt holders will dismiss the manager following a strategic default and
will keep dismissing him thereafter, the manager will keep diverting the cash °ows each
period following a strategic default or the manager's failure to renew the ¯rm's assets, since
v + x ¸Mv+x and v ¡ x ¸Mv¡x:
It is straightforward to see that c < a and (1), (2) and (3) are su±cient for the rest of
the conditions to hold.2
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